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Abstract—
Airline frequent-ﬂyer programs reward loyal customers
with beneﬁts like free tickets, seat upgrades, and priority
check-in and boarding. Inspired by the concept, this position
paper proposes an optional frequent-sharer1 program for p2p
systems. The frequent-sharer program is based on a point
system with goals of providing incentives to peers to con-
tribute to the system in order to receive better service from
it. The point system is comprised of an accounting component
that keeps track of each enrolled peer’s contribution to the
system, and an award component that provides a level of ser-
vice to each peer based on her level of contribution. We also
propose a mechanism based on the concept of reputation sys-
tems to track the contributions of the enrolled peers securely.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer(p2p)systemsarefoundedonthefundamen-
tal principle of cooperation among the peers. Peers mutu-
ally beneﬁt from peers’ willingness to provide service to
other peers. Users are drawn to these systems due to the
ability to locate a wide variety of content. Sharing content
and maintaining connectivity are important factors in the
success of such systems. This position paper focuses on
unstructured decentralized p2p systems like Gnutella [1],
where locating and retrieving the existing close-by copy of
the content requires peers to be mutually cooperative.
Inspired by the airline frequent-ﬂyer programs, we pro-
pose an optional frequent-sharer program to provide an in-
centive for the peers in a p2p system to share and serve the
content they download (or generate), stay online longer and
hence contribute to the system in order to receive better ser-
vice from it. The program is based on a point system that
serves to identify the contribution of each peer who enrolls
in the program and provides guidelines for various levels
of service to peers based on the level of contribution. We
also propose a security mechanism based on the concept of
reputation systems to prevent malicious and colluding peers
from thwarting the tracking of peer contributions.
In the absence of any incentive mechanism to share con-
tent, peers in p2p systems have sufﬁcient motivation to be
free-loaders. Free-loaders (aka free-riders) are peers who
1to mean peers who share frequently
only download content but never serve it to other peers.
This is evidenced by several measurement studies of ex-
isting p2p systems like Napster and Gnutella. Study [2]
concluded that at the time, nearly 70% of Gnutella users
shared no ﬁles, and nearly 50% of all responses were re-
turned by the top 1% of sharing hosts. Study in [3] quotes
the free-loaders to be about 25% in Gnutella and far lesser
in Napster. It is such free-loaders that the frequent-sharer
program attempts to motivate to contribute.
The roadmap to the rest of the position paper is as fol-
lows. SectionIIprovidesanoverviewofthefrequent-sharer
program. Section III describes the point system in detail
and section IV describes the reputation system based secu-
rity mechanism. Finally, section V concludes the paper.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE FREQUENT-SHARER PROGRAM
The basis of the frequent-sharer program, the point sys-
tem consists of two primary components. The ﬁrst com-
ponent is the accounting component that keeps track of the
contribution of each peer who is enrolled in the program.
It periodically updates points for the peers that enroll in
the frequent-sharer program, as they serve content. The
accounting component takes into consideration factors like
ﬁle popularity, ﬁle sizes, and peer bandwidth. Special em-
phasis is given to encourage peers to serve hard-to-ﬁnd or
unpopular content. The accounting component also gives
an incentive to the peers for staying online longer. The sec-
ond component of the point system is the award compo-
nent. A peer is provided a level of service (LoS) based on
the number of points she earns in the system. Peers who
choose not to enroll in the frequent-sharer program are pro-
vided a basic LoS throughout. The idea is to continue to
provide an acceptable LoS to uncooperative peers or peers
who chose not to enroll in the program, but differentiate
among various peers by providing enhanced and premium
LoS to peers who are sharing and serving more content than
others. The prevalent unstructured decentralized p2p sys-
tems like Gnutella have a content search phase and a re-
trievalphase. Acombinationofparametersthatimpacteach
of these phases are used to map to the various LoSs.
Because enrollment of peers in the frequent-sharer pro-
gram is optional, the accounting component runs only on2
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Fig. 1. Components of the Point System. Communication along the
dashed lines is periodic and that along the solid lines is per transaction.
peers that choose to enroll in the program, but the award
component requires each peer in the p2p system to run en-
hanced functionality of providing appropriate LoS to other
peers. This is important to encourage peers to enroll in the
program.
Peers can choose to enroll in the frequent-sharer program
any time by contacting a enrollment and aggregation agent
(EAA). The EAA could be replicated for efﬁciency pur-
poses. They can also decide to un-enroll at any time. The
ﬁrst time an enrolled peer joins a p2p network, she is eligi-
ble to receive the basic LoS. Through their participation in
the system, peers enrolled in the frequent-sharer program
can earn points and upgrade to a better LoS, while peers
who do not enroll in the program continue to receive the ba-
sic LoS. The point system allows peers to save their points
across sessions. Thus, a cooperative peer can maintain ben-
eﬁts of its participation in the system in spite of being off-
line for a while.
The accounting component involves keeping a counter of
points indicative of each enrolled peer’s contribution to the
system. This counter is sent along with each query and the
retrieval request. Based on the value of the counter, peers
who process the query and the peer who serves the content
decide on the LoS that the peer requesting the document
is eligible to receive. In a perfect world, each peer’s lo-
cal software can update the counter that keeps track of her
points. However, this simple mechanism could be thwarted
by the peers altering the point computation to their beneﬁt
or by tempering with the value of the stored counter. Hence,
there is a need for security mechanisms to enforce secure
point computation. We propose a reputation-based security
mechanism that uses (public, private) key pair and the EAA
to ensure fair periodic updates to each enrolled peer’s points
in the system, still ensuring points for each peer are kept lo-
cally for fast retrieval during content search and download.
There are two ways that malicious peers can hinder the
proper functioning of the award component. First, they may
not give better LoS to peers who are eligible for enhanced
orpremiumLoS.Second, theymaycolludewithotherpeers
and give each other a better LoS than the points justify.
Though some peers could be malicious but the success of
p2pstemsinpartduetomutualgoodwill. Peersmaychoose
not to enroll in the frequent-sharer program for various rea-
sons. One reason could be if they are not frequent users of
the system. Moreover, some peers may not want to get their
points tracked. The award component works on the belief
that whether or not a peer enrolls in the program, if she
trusts the points of other enrolled peers, she would be will-
ing to provide them with the appropriate LoS. This is for
three reasons. First, it is difﬁcult for peers to know if they
have indeed received the LoS they were eligible for. Sec-
ond, a light-weight secure enforcement of the award com-
ponent does not seem possible because of the possibility of
a man-in-the-middle attack. Third, rewards from malicious
behavior in the reward component are limited, unlike those
possible by altering the point computation of the account-
ing component. As a result, section IV only describes the
security measures for the accounting component.
Figure 1 shows the various components of the point sys-
tem to be run on enrolled peers (EPs) and other peers (OPs)
in the system. The communication between peers shown
in the ﬁgure takes place only during search and retrieval
phases and that with the EAA is periodic.
III. DETAILS OF POINT SYSTEM
As mentioned before, there are two main components of
the point system:
 An accounting component that credits points in an en-
rolled peer’s account based on her level of contribution
in the p2p network.
 An award component that chooses appropriate level of
service (LoS) for each peer based on the number of
points she has earned in the system.
A. Accounting Component
The basic idea behind accounting is very simple, enrolled
peers can receive better LoS for their downloads if they
serve more content and stay online longer. The ﬁrst time a
peer joins a p2p network, she starts out with zero points and
is only eligible for the basic LoS. Through her contribution
to the system, she can earn more points and become eligible
for better LoS (enhanced or premium). In order to ensure
that peers continue to cooperate even after becoming eligi-
ble for enhanced or premium LoS, points earned by a peer
expire periodically. Hence, peers have to keep contribut-
ing to the system in order to retain or upgrade their LoS.
Peers who are not enrolled in the frequent-sharer program3
always receive a basic LoS. Peers retain their points across
sessions, so that a peer can continue to receive better LoS if
she was a cooperative participant of the system in the past.
For now, assume that the points for each enrolled peer are
updated and maintained in the local software. Section IV
discusses the details of how the points are periodically up-
dated by the enrollment and aggregation agent (EAA) that
handles the enrollment in the program because of security
implications of this naive approach. Points are kept locally
for fast retrieval but encrypted by the central authority. Sec-
tions III-A.1 and III-A.2 detail the algorithms that are used
to credit an enrolled peer’s points.
1) Basic Accounting: In the most simple case, a peer
enrolled in the program earns a point for every request it
serves. We call this scheme the one-for-one accounting.
Thisschemehassomeobviousshortcomings. Itofferspeers
an incentive to serve requests for very short ﬁles in order
to keep their upstream bandwidth consumption to a mini-
mum. This can be avoided by earning points in terms of
content size (i.e., every megabyte of content downloaded
pays a point and every megabyte of content served earns a
point). We call this scheme the per-MB accounting. Fur-
ther, a peer with high bandwidth connection will be able to
serve content faster than a peer with a slower connection.
The accounting should account for a peer’s serving capac-
ity as well. We assume that methods exist to ﬁnd out peers’
connectivity since it was found in study [3] that peers often
state their bandwidth availability incorrectly.
Another issue is that some ﬁles are popular while oth-
ers are not. Since unpopular ﬁles may not be accessed fre-
quently, the peers who keep them in the shared directory
need to be given credit for being online and ready to serve
the hard to ﬁnd content. Figure III-A.1, describes a basic
accounting algorithm that updates the points for a peer with
bandwidth bw, based on the ﬁle sizes served, its bandwidth,
and gives credit to the peer for being online.
Tunable parameters:
ﬁle size factor, f, f 2 integer
bandwidth factor, b, b 2<
time units in hours, t, t 2 integer
Upload Credit (UC): for every request served of size s
MBytes for the ith ﬁle, earn points as:
b((si=f)  (bw=b))c
Online Credit (OC): points earned every t time units for
staying online/sharing content:
n (where n is the number
of ﬁles in shared directory)
Total points in a peer’s account for a
uploads in b time units P
i a  UC+bOC
Fig. 2. Basic Accounting Algorithm
Some existing Gnutella like p2p protocols facilitate par-
allel downloads. Above formula for computing the number
of points a peer has earned can be used without any change
for such p2p systems. It will give credit equivalent to shar-
ing one ﬁle to each serving peer, but only according to the
size of the download it facilitated.
2) Enhanced Accounting with Individual File Populari-
ties: Measurement study of Gnutella queries( [4]) found
that the popularity of search strings follows a Zipf-like dis-
tribution. Study [5] of availability and locality measure-
ments of p2p ﬁle systems noted that most popular 10% of
the transferred ﬁles account for 60% of the total ﬁles trans-
ferred; 10% of most popular stored ﬁles account for 50%
of the total ﬁles stored. Further, the authors observe that
4MB was the most popular ﬁle size. This implies that on
while some ﬁles are rarely accessed, most popular ﬁles are
accessed very heavily. Although the basic point system de-
scribed in III-A.1 recognizes the presence of hard-to-ﬁnd
content, it does not take into account the exact ﬁle popular-
ity distribution. Hence, it may not produce the best results
in terms of capturing the participation in the system. If a
p2p system provides dynamic ﬁle popularity updates, this
enhanced point system can be used. Secure functioning of
the accounting component involves periodic computations
by the EAA. As described in section IV, the EAA can facil-
itate such dynamic popularity updates. The basic formula
fortotal point computation remainsthe same asbefore, only
the upload credit (UC) component changes. Figure III-A.2
shows the changed component to be used in the formula in
ﬁgure III-A.1. The ﬁle popularities are shown as a function
Func(pop) in the ﬁgure. It has been shown in [6] that for
replication purposes, square root popularity produces the
optimal results. Hence, we conjecture that incorporating
the square root of ﬁle popularity as a divisor in the compu-
tation of points for a peer would produce optimal results.
However, the exact function remains an area of future in-
vestigation.
Upload Credit (UC): for every request served of size s
MBytes for the ith ﬁle, earn points as:
b(si=(f  Func(popi))  (bw=b))c
Fig. 3. Enhanced Accounting with Individual File Popularities
B. Award Component
While the accounting component ensures every enrolled
peer’s points are updated according to its level of contribu-
tion, the award component which runs on each peer’s soft-
ware uses those points to decide on the LoS other peers are
eligible for. When a peer performs a search for content or
requests retrieval of content, her points are sent along with
the request. In the case of peers new to the system or the
peers who are not enrolled in the program, these points will
be zero, corresponding to the basic LoS. For others peers
the points will be positive. The peers that process the query
and the peer that serves the content provide a LoS to the re-
quester based on the points it has earned in the system. An4
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Fig. 4. Levels of Service in a P2P Network
example of the parameters that can be mapped to various
LoSs are: number of hops a peer’s query is allowed to go
in search of the content (H), type of scheduling the serving
peer uses in serving the content (S), and rate at which the
peer serving the content is willing to transfer the document
(R). Parameter H is speciﬁc to p2p networks similar to
Gnutella and may be different for other p2p networks. The
mapping of number of hops H to a LoS could be indepen-
dent of the number of peers enrolled in the program, how-
everthemappingsofrateR, andschedulingS mighthaveto
be changed for the system as the enrollment in the frequent-
sharer program changes. This can be done by monitoring
the change in enrollment observed by individual peers.
In its basic form, the LoS can have three types of ser-
vices, based on particular combination of values for H, S,
and R. These levels are referred to as basic LoS, enhanced
LoS, and premium LoS. Basic LoS is the service rendered
by the system to the new, or uncooperative peers and to
peers who do not enroll in the program. It corresponds to
limiting the H, S, and R parameters by the peers when they
have enhanced or premium customers in the system. We de-
ﬁne the enhanced LoS to be for peers that maintain points
P deﬁned by a  P<b . Point more than that earn a peer
premium service from the system and less than that only
qualify a peer for basic service. a and b are positive valued
tunable system parameters. Figure III-B shows the various
LoSs.
IV. SECURITY ISSUES IN ACCOUNTING COMPONENT
When we described the accounting component, we as-
sumed that the counter maintained by the accounting com-
ponent that keeps the most recent points for each peer is
kept and updated in the enrolled peer’s software itself. P2p
servent software may be easily modiﬁed by malicious peers
and as as result they can run a version of the software that
thwarts the point computation algorithm.
The proposed security mechanism is based on the con-
cept of reputation systems. Points maintained by the ac-
counting component in essence are credentials that com-
prise each peer’s reputation, upon which the award compo-
nent makes decisions about the LoS. eBay and Slashdot are
examples of existing centralized reputation systems. Free-
havenproject[7]andNICEproject[8]useasimilarconcept
for their systems.
We assume that each peer interested in joining the
frequent-sharer program obtains a (public, private) key pair
from the enrollment and aggregation agent (EAA). The
EAA could be replicated for efﬁciency and availability rea-
sons. To avoid security issues arising out of peers obtain-
ing multiple identities for the sake of earning more points
in the system, we propose using human intervention of the
type proposed in [9] while obtaining the (public, private)
key pair. Further, we assume that each peer also has access
to EAA’s public key. The assumption is that the EAA is not
malicious but peers can be malicious and can collude with
other peers.
Let us denote the public and private keys of the requester
peers by PKr and SKr and those of the senders by PKs
and SKs. The following exchange takes place between the
requester peer and the sender peer at the time of ﬁle down-
load:
 After the sender sends the ﬁle, the requester
sends a requester portion of the receipt (RPR)
frequester identity, ﬁle name, ﬁle size, time stamp,
other infogSKr to the sender peer. other info might
be the ﬁle popularity, if the enhanced accounting with
individual ﬁle popularities is used.
 The sender peer veriﬁes the information us-
ing the requester’s public key and stores
ffrequester identity, ﬁle name, ﬁle size, time stamp,
other infogSKrfsender identity, sender bandwidthggSKs
as a receipt of the transaction. The receipt is shown in
ﬁgure 5.
Requester Identity
Time Stamp
Other Information
Requester
Private Key
Sender Bandwidth
Sender 
Sender Identity Private Key
File Size
File Name
Fig. 5. Receipt of the Transaction
If any one of the peers involved in the transaction is not
enrolled in the frequent-sharer program, above receipt ex-
change does not take place. This is to ensure that peers who
do not enroll in the program do not incur the overhead. In
that case, if the sender is enrolled in the program, it would
not be able to get credit for serving the ﬁle. This could
potentially serve as a motivation for the senders to prefer
transactions only with other enrolled participants.
Above receipt generation ensures that the senders do not
get credit without serving the ﬁle. This is because the re-
quester peer does not give the receipt before getting the ﬁle.
Since the sender gets credits for serving the ﬁle, it has no
reason to drop the receipt. If the receiver does not send the5
RPR, the sender can report to the EAA. Beyond a threshold
number of such complaints the requester can be blacklisted.
If enrolled in the program, periodically the sender peers
send these receipts to the EAA and they are translated into
credits to each of their points by the EAA. The credit com-
putation is in accordance with either of the point compu-
tation algorithms described in sections III-A.1 and III-A.2,
taking into account factors like the ﬁle size, popularity, and
sender’s bandwidth. The frequency of these updates would
depend on the balance between the overhead for the EAA,
the sender peer, the network, and that of keeping sender ac-
counts up-to-date.
After processing the receipts, the EAA
sends an encrypted credential fEAA identity,
time stamp, sender points,sender identitygSKEAA
to
the sender peer. We expect the credential to contain points
in ﬁxed denominations. Left over odd denominations of
points can be stored with the EAA to be incorporated in the
future credentials. The time stamp in the credentials serves
to expire the points. The expiration duration is expected
to be a system parameter. When the requesters send their
points during search and retrieval phases, the expired points
do not carry any value. The motivation behind expiration
of points is to prevent the peers who have once earned
good credit in the system to never contribute after that
and still receive better LoS. The EAA does not store the
accounts for any peer. Thus, peers keep their latest points
for transaction purposes and do not have to contact the
EAA often. Since the credentials are encrypted, tempering
with the points is not a possibility. Another important
security concern addressed by EAA’s processing of the
receipts is that the EAA can run some simple algorithms
to detect collusion among peers to increase their points in
the system. This can be done by giving fewer credits if the
same set of peers have many transactions with each other.
Requester
Enrolled
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file
retrieval request
credentials
Sender
Enrolled
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Fig. 6. Communication Induced by the Accounting Component.
Figure 6 shows the communication between the account-
ing component of two communicating peers and that be-
tween the sender peer and the EAA. The enrolled requester
peer sends the receiver portion of the receipt (RPR) after
receiving the ﬁle. The enrolled sender peer veriﬁes the
RPR and stores the receipt. At some later time, the enrolled
sender obtains credentials in ﬁxed denominations, from the
EAA, as points.
The accounting component also gives credit to peers for
staying online, based on the number of ﬁles they are shar-
ing. This will be done by periodic monitoring by the EAA.
The exact frequency of such monitoring remains to be in-
vestigated. Just as the EAA sends encrypted credentials to
relevant peers after processing receipts, the credits earned
by each peer after the monitoring can be sent by the EAA
to the peers.
The enhanced point computation algorithm described
in III-A.2 requires an information about ﬁle popularities.
One possible way to get such information would be for the
EAAtodosuchcomputationssinceithasinformationabout
which ﬁles were accessed from processing the receipts. Lo-
cal views of peers about ﬁle popularities may not give accu-
rate information. The EAA can send such updates to peers
when it sends them the processed credentials.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a frequent-sharer program, based on a
point system to increase participation in decentralized un-
structured p2p systems. It securely tracks each peer’s con-
tribution to the system and provides a level of service com-
mensurate with the participation. Currently, we are working
on the performance evaluation of the point system.
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